Tax competition is discussed as a source of inefficiency in international taxation and in fiscal federalism. Two preconditions for the existence of such effects of tax competition are that mobile factors locate or reside in jurisdictions withceteris paribus -lower tax rates, and that taxes are actually set strategically in order to attract mobile production factors. It is well known from studies about Swiss cantonal and local income tax competition that Swiss taxpayers reside where income taxes are low. In this paper, empirical results on strategic tax setting by cantonal governments are presented for a panel of the Swiss cantons from 1984 to 1999. Completing the evidence on Swiss tax competition, income tax rates in cantons are the lower, the lower the tax rates of their neighbors.
INTRODUCTION
The modern literature on fiscal federalism and on international taxation uses two different theoretical structures to motivate fiscal interactions: tax competition and yardstick competition. 1 Despite many studies addressing this issue, there is wide disagreement as to the empirical relevance of each theory. In order to substantiate the claim that tax competition exists, empirical evidence on fiscally induced migration, on the one hand, and strategic tax setting of governments, on the other, is required. If mobile production factors reside or locate in jurisdictions with -ceteris paribus -lower taxes, and governments in the competing jurisdictions set tax rates in order to attract mobile production factors, sufficient evidence on the existence of tax competition is provided. The existence of yardstick competition, on the contrary, requires evidence on the impact of interjurisdictional tax differentials on political decision-making, on the one hand, as citizens evaluate the performance of their government by using other, often neighboring, jurisdictions as a yardstick, and take their political decisions based on such comparisons. This leads to tax mimicking between jurisdictions due to informational externalities and, again, strategic tax setting, on the other hand. Evidence on strategic fiscal interactions is thus insufficient to disentangle the two different theoretical mechanisms.
While there are numerous recent empirical papers on fiscal interactions between jurisdictions, their success in identifying each type of competition is indeed mixed. 2 Most studies report evidence that tax rates in one jurisdiction are positively depending on tax rates in neighboring or other competing jurisdictions. With the exception of Besley and Case (1995) , the literature has, however, difficulties to establish a link between tax mimicking and the re-election of representatives such that a positive spatial correlation of tax rates could either be interpreted as evidence for tax competition or for yardstick competition. Bordignon et al. (2003) , Schaltegger and Küttel (2002) and Solé-Ollé (2003) also provide only indirect evidence for yardstick competition, although their evidence is admittedly hard to be interpreted otherwise.
In tax competition models, strategic tax setting is supposedly accompanied by fiscally induced mobility of at least one production factor (Wilson, 1999) . In yardstick competition models, labor and capital are usually assumed to be physically immobile (Besley and Case, 1995; Besley and Smart, 2007; Bodenstein and Ursprung, 2005; Wrede, 2001) . Indirect evidence that helps to distinguish these two classes of models from each other could thus use the existing extent of fiscally induced mobility as a precondition. Given relatively high fiscally induced mobility of factors of production between jurisdictions, a positive correlation between the jurisdiction's tax rate and the average of competing jurisdictions' tax rates would lend support to the tax competition hypothesis. On the contrary, a relatively low fiscally induced mobility together with such a positive correlation between tax rates would provide some (weak) evidence in support of the yardstick competition model.
In that respect, evidence from Switzerland is quite interesting. As Feld (2000) , Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) , Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1996) , Liebig et al. (2007) , Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2006) , Pommerehne et al. 1996) , (German and French evidence), and individual income tax surcharges (Belgian evidence), personal income tax schedules of the Swiss cantons are highly progressive. Hence, it is useful to look at the strategic interdependence between jurisdictions across the different tax brackets. Case (1993) considers the progressivity of the income tax schedule in her study on US income tax competition by looking at the tax liability in three different tax brackets ($25,000, $40,000, $100,000). The dataset in this paper allows for an analysis of the whole income tax schedule. We analyze 12 tax brackets, but report only 11 of them leaving out the least interesting group of taxpayers below a yearly taxable income of SFr30,000 (100 Swiss francs being approximately 60 US dollars) in order to meet the adding up condition of the reported system estimates. These data allow for an investigation as to whether tax competition exists to a different extent for different groups of taxpayers. According to our results it appears that tax rates of individuals earning more than SFr100,000 taxable income a year are to a larger extent prone to strategic interaction with competing jurisdictions than those of lower-income earners, although the differences are not extreme.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a brief introduction to Swiss fiscal federalism is provided. The basic econometric model is presented in Section 3 and the estimation results in Section 4. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
A PRIMER ON FISCAL FEDERALISM IN SWITZERLAND
The Swiss cantons have a high degree of autonomy both with regard to expenditures and taxation. The cantons have the basic power to tax personal income and firms' profits. The municipalities can levy a surcharge on cantonal tax rates. The federal government obtains its revenue from several indirect taxes (e.g. value added and mineral oil tax), a highly progressive tax on the individual income and a proportional tax on corporate profits. Hence, all three layers of government have access to the taxation of income, whereas taxpayers are not allowed to deduct taxes paid to one layer against liabilities to another.
It is shown in Figure 1 that the cantonal tax autonomy leads to different tax burdens across the Swiss federation. The income and property tax burden varies between an index value of 46.5 in the canton of Zug and 165.1 in the canton of Obwalden, with the average Swiss tax burden having an index value of 100. The tax burden in Obwalden, hence, is more than three times as heavy as in Zug. Similar differences obtain in the taxation of corporate profits. The level of autonomy on the revenue side is met by an equally high degree of autonomy on the spending side. The cantons are in charge of providing typical regional or local public goods, such as public safety and education. incomes of SFr1 million and more for married taxpayers with two children in order to illustrate the potentially occurring strategic interaction among cantons. The mid-gray cantons comprise the group with the lowest tax burden between 12% and 18%. The light gray cantons are those with tax burdens between 19% and 24%, while the dark gray cantons have tax rates above 24%. The income tax burden is usually higher in the Western than in the Eastern part of Switzerland. However, in each larger geographical area, cantons with relatively low tax rates exist that challenge the higher tax economic centers. This holds for the comparison of Zurich with Zug and Schwyz, but also for St. Gallen with both Appenzell or Berne with Fribourg and the Valais. For example, a married taxpayer with two children and a yearly income of SFr1 million faces a consolidated tax rate of 23.6% in the canton of Zurich, but only 7.2% in the city of Freienbach in the canton of Schwyz -which is less than one hour of travel time away from Zurich (Eidgenössische Steuerverwaltung, 2006) . This geographical pattern points to the fact that strategic interaction may take place in two different ways. On the one hand, and quite obvious from lower tax surrounding areas may compete with each other, for example Geneva with Zurich. Thus, there is also a variation of taxes according to whether a canton is close to an economic center or not, i.e. peripheral cantons have lower tax burdens than cantons that are adjacent to agglomerations. Such a twofold strategic tax competition should be reflected in the econometric specification.
AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS FOR SWISS CANTONS
The basic econometric specification follows the models of Büttner (2001) , Case (1993) and . The two latter papers also present theoretical models as a basis for the econometric specification, a yardstick competition model and Büttner (2001) a tax competition model. It thus suffices in this paper to draw the basic lines of arguments. These theoretical models of tax (and of yardstick) competition suggest that the tax rates in each canton depend on tax rates of competing jurisdictions.
In the econometric specifications used here, we first assume that the income tax rates in canton i are influenced by the (unweighted average of) income tax rates in geographically neighboring cantons. By taking the unweighted average of neighbors' tax rates, we weight each neighbor of each canton equally. In a second subsequent specification, we assume that the taxes in canton i are influenced by the geographically neighboring cantons both at the local level and at the regional level. Each neighbor j of a canton i has its own neighbors k which influence the tax rates of canton j. Neighboring cantons at the regional level of a canton i thus correspond to the local cantonal neighbors for each of the local neighbors of a canton i. This specification follows Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) implicitly hypothesizing that the influence of the fiscal policy of neighboring cantons at the regional level should be lower than the one of neighboring cantons at the local level.
In addition to neighbors' taxes, a few other economic and demographic variables have an impact on tax policy at the Swiss cantonal level. Cantonal tax policies do not only depend on the capacity to generate revenue by own taxes, but also on grants from other jurisdictions. Thus, we include federal lump-sum grants per capita in the analysis reflecting the availability of alternative funds. We do not include spending variables or bond financing in order to circumvent (additional) endogeneity problems. Moreover, we introduce standard control variables like cantonal income per capita, the cantonal unemployment rate as a proxy for business cycle developments and the accompanying necessity to increase social welfare spending and financing, and demographic factors like population size, the share of the population younger than 20 years and older than 65 years. A regional dummy is included that takes on the value of one for German-speaking cantons and zero otherwise. As mentioned above, it is well known that tax rates are higher in French-and Italian-speaking cantons than in the German-speaking ones. These differences might reflect cultural differences between the Swiss cantons that have to be considered to avoid an omitted variable bias in the estimates. In addition, time dummies are included. The estimation equation of the first specification thus finally becomes (see again Case, 1993, p. 141) :
wheret g tÀ1 is an [NT Â 1] vector of the average of cantons' geographic neighbors' taxes of the previous period for T years in income class g; X tÀ1 is an [NT Â k] matrix of k observable cantons' economic and demographic characteristics of the preceding period, b g 0 is a constant term for each income class g, and e is an error term which is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance. The parameter b 1 indicates to what extent a canton's tax policy is influenced by the tax policy in neighboring cantons. We estimate this model in a specification with time fixed effects for the levels of the 11 different tax rates comprising the income tax schedule. Owing to these different tax brackets, equation (1) equations which vary according to the income tax rate in each income class g and the neighboring cantons' tax rates of each income class g. The vector X tÀ1 of economic and demographic control variables remains the same for all 11 classes. The 11 tax brackets are the following:
SFr30,000 Y 1 oSFr50,000;
SFr50,000 Y 2 oSFr60,000; SFr60,000 Y 3 oSFr80,000;
SFr80,000 Y 4 oSFr100,000; SFr100,000 Y 5 oSFr150,000; SFr150,000 Y 6 oSFr200,000; SFr200,000 Y 7 oSFr300,000; SFr300,000 Y 8 oSFr400,000; SFr400,000 Y 9 oSFr500,000; SFr500,000 Y 10 oSFr1,000,000; Y 11 ! SFr1,000,000, with Y g as taxable income in income class g. Data on average effective tax rates across time are consistently available for these 11 income classes only for married taxpayers without children. The difference to singles and married taxpayers with two children, as the other two types of ('normal') taxpayers available is not very important, but tax rates on retiree income deviates considerably. This is something that should be kept in mind for the next section.
Equation (1) cannot be consistently estimated by OLS because there is an obvious endogeneity problem. Hausman tests indicate that the neighboring tax rates at the local level or at the regional level are endogenous (available upon request). So b 1 is correlated with the error term e and OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent. Thus, we basically estimate our system by using instrumental variables. We follow Büttner (2001) who uses a method proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) and Kelejian and Robinson (1993) using spatial lags of the local characteristics as instruments. The instruments are the (unweighted) averages of the economic and demographic controls X tÀ1 of the neighbors.
An additional problem arises because the dataset used has a panel structure making the existence of a first-order autocorrelation in the error terms highly probable. Instead of using a lagged endogenous variable and instruments to control for potential biases, we correct the standard errors for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity by using a generalized method of moments (GMM) method. We thus estimate the system of equations by GMM using spatial lags of controls as instruments. 3 Because of the adding-up condition of the system estimator, the lowest and least interesting income class of income below SFr30,000 is left out of consideration. consideration. The overall performance of the model is relatively well. The adjusted R 2 indicates that 66% to 76% of the variance of the different income tax rates in the system can be explained. The Jarque-Bera test statistics indicate that the hypothesis of normal distribution of the residuals can be rejected for five of the 11 income groups at least on the 10% level. Among these income groups are middle/upper-income classes from SFr200,000 to less than SFr400,000. Since these are relatively important groups, the problem of non-normality of the residuals is going to be addressed subsequently.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
As the w 2 -statistics in the last column of Table 1 indicate, the hypothesis that neighbors' tax rates of the previous period have no impact on the income tax rate of the canton under consideration cannot be rejected at any conventional significance level for the whole system of equations. However, in each single income class except for the lower one, neighbors' tax rates of the previous period are significantly different from zero at least on the 5% significance level. For the nine classes of incomes higher than SFr60,000 annual taxable income, neighbors' tax rates are even significant on the 1% level. In addition, there is a positive relationship between the income tax rates of a canton and those of its neighbors indicating that cantons appear to reduce their tax rates when the neighbors reduce them and increase tax rates when neighbors increase them. Of the control variables, only population size and the share of the old population are significantly different from zero for the whole system according to the w 2 -statistics. Since higher tax rates for married taxpayers without children -ceteris paribus -imply lower tax rates for retirees, the significantly positive coefficients for the old population, in particular in the lower-income groups, is no surprise.
The estimation results presented in Table 2 are robust estimations controlling for outliers with dummy variables (as mentioned in the notes to Table 2 ). The Jarque-Bera test statistics now indicate that the hypothesis of normal distribution of the residuals can be rejected only at the 10% level for income classes from SFr400,000 to less than SFr500,000. This hypothesis is also rejected at the 5% level for the income class from SFr500,000 to less than SFr1,000,000. The explanatory power of the model increases. The adjusted R 2 is now at least at 0.74. Moreover, for ten of the 11 income classes in the system, 80-85% of the variance can be explained. The w 2 -statistics in the final column of Table 2 indicate that the explanatory power of the single variables increases as well. This does not only hold for the two control variables mentioned before. In addition, the neighbors' tax rate and the regional dummy variable are now significant for the whole system on the 1% and 5% level respectively. Moreover the influences of the population and the share of old population increase. Finally, lump-sum grants are significantly different from zero on the 5% level for income classes from SFr100,000 to less than SFr300,000. As the sign of the coefficient is negative, a rise in the amount of lump-sum grants induces a decrease of the tax rate for the middle-and middle-upper-income classes. As the coefficients for the regional dummy indicate, the German-speaking cantons have significantly lower tax rates L. P. Feld and E. Reulier than other cantons. This result appears to be stronger for the middle-income classes. Again, the hypothesis that cantonal income tax rates positively depend upon respective neighbors' tax rates cannot be rejected according to our results. It is interesting to note that in the income class of SFr30,000 to less than SFr50,000, neighbors' tax rates are significant but only on the 5% level.
The estimated coefficients of the average of neighbors' tax rates of the previous period increase with income up to the income class of SFr200,000 to less than SFr300,000. The coefficients decline in the remaining three upperincome groups to levels below the one estimated in the income class of SFr200,000, but they are still higher than those in the income groups below SFr80,000. As the results of the Wald tests on equality of paired coefficients presented in Table 3 indicate, these differences are however not statistically significant.
The smaller region kind of tax competition between neighbors may not be the only way tax competition takes place. Larger regional areas might be in locational competition with each other. In order to check the possibility that tax rates of a canton are influenced by the tax-setting behavior of local and regional neighboring cantons, though perhaps to different extents, the following model is proposed:
is an [NT Â 1] vector of the average of cantons' local neighbors' taxes of the previous period for T years in income class g; andt g;regional tÀ1
is an [NT Â 1] vector of the average of cantons' regional neighbors' (the neighbors' of the neighbors') taxes of the previous period for T years in income class g. The parameters g 1 and g 2 indicate to what extent a canton's tax policy is influenced by the tax policy of local neighboring cantons and of regional neighboring cantons respectively. We estimate this model for the 11 different tax rates comprising the income tax schedule. The results are presented in Table 4 .
The overall performance of model (2) is quite good because 67-76% of the variance of the different equations of the system can be explained. The w 2statistics indicate that four explanatory variables are significantly different from zero for the whole system. These are the local neighbors' tax, the regional neighbors' (the neighbors' of the neighbors') tax and also the population and the share of the older population. With respect to demographic and economic variables, the estimated coefficients and the Wald tests associated with them are quite similar to those obtained by estimating model (1) .
But focusing on the mimicking coefficients at the local and at the regional level provides interesting insights. First, all the mimicking coefficients at the local level are significantly different from zero on the 5% level and for the nine highest-income classes on the 1% level. Those coefficients are positive and quite similar in size to those estimated in model (1) specification for the estimation model which enlarges the geographical area of competitive cantons thus leads to similar results as far as tax-mimicking behavior at the local level is concerned. Second, these new system estimates allow for considering a possible influence of tax setting in neighboring cantons at the regional level. It is interesting to note that, although the w 2statistic is significant on the 5% level for the whole system, the coefficients of the regional neighboring tax rates (the neighbors' of the neighbors') are significantly different from zero on the 5% level only for the income classes from SFr50,000 to less than SFr150,000. The absolute size of local and regional mimicking coefficients is quite similar for those income classes. Third, the results of the Wald test of equality of paired coefficients indicate that the intensity of tax mimicking at the local level is the same for all income classes (Table 5) . Moreover, at the regional level, tax mimicking has a similar magnitude in the income classes from SFr50,000 to less than SFr150,000 (Table 6 ). And in each equation for income classes from SFr50,000 to less than SFr150,000, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the intensity of mimicking at the local level is similar to the one at the regional level (Table 7) . All those results provide evidence for a strategic tax-setting behavior of cantonal authorities. When tax rates for the income classes from SFr50,000 to less than SFr150,000 are politically decided, the cantonal finance secretary at the same time pays attention to the local as well as to the regional neighboring tax rates of the previous period. But as regards the other income classes, only the tax rate of local neighboring cantons of the previous period appears to be considered. This result could be explained by the fact that taxpayers in the income classes from SFr50,000 to less than SFr150,000 correspond to young adults who just start working. For those couples, it is a crucial moment of their lives because they have to decide the place where they want to reside. These young couples are going to consider a residence place within a larger range than others. This evidence of strategic tax setting corresponds nicely with the results by Feld (2000) and Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) for cross-sections of Swiss cantons in 1990 on the one hand and Feld and Frey (2000) for a panel of Swiss cantons in the period from 1981/82 to 1993/94 on the other. While those cross-section studies find the quantitatively most important negative impact of tax rates in the income class of SFr100,000 and above, this panel data analysis finds the strongest negative impact for the income classes between SFr75,000 and SFr200,000.
Non-normality of the residuals in some income classes is a similar problem in this specification as it is before. Controlling for outliers improves the estimates once again. It should be noted from the results of Table 8 that, controlling for outliers, the lump-sum grants and the regional dummy become significant at the 5% and 10% level for the whole system. Otherwise, the structure of estimates remains relatively robust and confirms the results about the mimicking behavior of cantonal authorities. Table 6 Results of Wald tests of equality of paired coefficients of regional neighbors' tax rates Regional neighbors' tax 30
Regional neighbors' tax 50
Regional neighbors' tax 60
Regional neighbors' tax 80
Regional neighbors' tax 100
Regional neighbors' tax 150
Regional neighbors' tax 200
Regional neighbors' tax 300
Regional neighbors' tax 400
Regional neighbors' tax 500
Regional neighbors' tax 30 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Tax competition is of great public interest in particular in the European Union. Nevertheless empirical evidence strongly establishing the existence, not mentioning the inefficiency, of tax competition is scarce. Obtaining such evidence is the more important, since competing theoretical hypotheses as to the usefulness of tax competition exist. In this paper, evidence on strategic tax setting is provided on the basis of a simultaneous equations model with 11 income tax rates for the Swiss cantons using panel data from 1984 to 1999. The results lend support for the hypothesis that strategic interactions between sub-federal jurisdictions in Switzerland exist. Income tax rates in the cantons -ceteris paribus -depend positively on local neighbors' tax rates of the previous period for all taxable income classes and also on regional neighbors' (the neighbors' of the neighbors') tax rates of the previous period for taxable income classes from SFr50,000 to less than SFr150,000. If neighboring cantons reduce their income taxes, the canton of consideration reduces its tax rates as well. This result indicates that the largest extent of tax competition among neighbors is obtained for middle-income groups.
The results are in line with evidence obtained for the US sub-federal jurisdictions, for Canadian provinces or municipalities of British Columbia, but also for Belgian and Italian municipalities and Spanish and German local jurisdictions. In addition to the new insights from the evidence over a whole range of income tax rates presented in this paper, the results are however also adding to the current understanding of individual income tax competition in Switzerland. Since Swiss taxpayers choose their place of residence in cantons where they find favorable tax conditions (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2001) , a spatial interdependence of income tax rates provides evidence for the existence of tax competition in Switzerland.
